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The return of fiscal policy and the euro area fiscal rule  
Vítor Constâncio*  
 
Abstract 
The text describes the theoretical developments of the assignment rules regarding fiscal 
and monetary policies and the respective roles in macroeconomics stabilisation. 
Monetary policy emerged as the dominant policy, reducing the active macro role of fiscal 
policy to taking care of debt sustainability. This consensus started to change, and a new 
view has appeared, giving a more active role to fiscal policy. The article concludes with 
a brief analysis of fiscal rules, followed by a discussion about the European Union fiscal 
framework, and its necessary revision. 
 
Even before the present intense use of fiscal policy to deal with the social 
and economic fallout of the coronavirus crisis, fiscal policy had started to 
undergo a sort of rebirth as a macroeconomic stabilisation tool. The present 
text was prepared for a Conference last November and is reproduced here 
with minor adjustments 1. During several decades that preceded the 
present crisis, the mainstream consensus about the stabilisation role of 
macroeconomic policies has given prominence or even exclusivity to 
monetary policy, confining fiscal policy to the passive role of pursuing debt 
sustainability and microeconomic efficiency goals. The exception to this 
rule came just in short episodes when it was necessary to respond to deep 
economic shock as it happened between 2008 and 2010. The turn to fiscal 
consolidation materialised in the July 2010 G20 meeting in Toronto. The 
way this restrictive policy was implemented in the euro area led to a second 
dip recession that was only felt in Europe. After that, monetary policy was 
put again in sole charge of macro stabilisation policy and had to embark 
quite unconventional instruments to struggle against low inflation and 
subdued growth.  
In the past few years, though, fiscal policy seems to emerge again as a 
necessary active policy tool in view of the clear diminishing returns of 
monetary policy and its visible inability, after ten years, to place inflation 
steadily at the consensual target of 2 percent.  
                                                          
* School Board President at the Lisbon School of Economics and Management (ISEG); former European Central 
Bank Vice-President. Email: constancio@iseg.ulisboa.pt. 
1 This text was the basis for a keynote address at the International Network for Economic Research (INFER) 
Workshop on “New challenges for fiscal policy” organised by UECE – Research Unit on Complexity and Economics,  
Lisbon School of Economics and Management (ISEG) on 22 November 2019 at ISEG.. 
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 In the remaining text, I will first briefly describe the historical developments 
around the monetary and fiscal policy macroeconomic roles. Then I will 
examine the reasons behind a new view about fiscal policy that has 
emerged. This will be followed by an analysis of the search for fiscal rules 
and by a discussion about the European Union fiscal framework and its 
necessary revision. 
After the Second World War, a Keynesian consensus prevailed, giving 
fiscal policy the dominant role in targeting output stabilisation whereas 
monetary policy had a more passive role in view of its suspected low 
effectiveness. There was even a sort of fiscal dominance of monetary policy 
with most central banks not being independent and being expected to 
cooperate with the Treasuries. The first edition of Samuelson´s Manual 2 
had a section named “The inadequacies of monetary control of the 
business cycle” where it was repeated the old saying that “one can take a 
horse to the water but cannot make him drink”. This consensus lasted until 
the mid-sixties when criticism of fiscal policy started alongside the renewal 
of monetarism promoted by Friedman 3. The inflation increase that began 
in the late sixties and was magnified by the 1973 oil shock helped the 
monetarist cause. 
In the long dispute between Keynesians and monetarists during the sixties 
and seventies, the arguments against the effectiveness of fiscal policy were 
of three types: 
1) First, those related to the slowness of fiscal policy implementation. Long 
inside lags for tax changes and long outside lags to implement expenditure, 
especially public investment. This is a genuine problem of fiscal policy that 
can only be mitigated by keeping a permanent collection of adequate 
projects.   
2) Crowding-out of private investment and consumer durables as deficits and 
increasing debt would increase interest rates. A long and dated debate 
ensued about the elasticities of IS and LM curves and whether or not LM 
was near vertical. This debate had consequences for the size of fiscal 
multipliers, a subject that surfaced again after 2008 and that I will address 
later. It is worth noting that there are many historical episodes where bigger 
deficits did not induce higher interest rates. That is what happens in 
situations close to liquidity traps, like the one that occurred after the 2008 
crisis. 
                                                          
2 Samuelson, Paul (1948) “Economics: an introductory analysis” McGraw-Hill, pp 353 
3 Friedman, Milton (1968) “ The role of monetary policy” AEA Presidential Address  
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3) The third category of arguments was related to consumer behaviour and 
the reaction to fiscal stimulus. According to the Permanent Income theory 
of consumption, temporary fiscal expansionary measures could not affect 
consumers´ behaviour as they would react only to their view on their 
permanent income.  
Regarding permanent changes in taxes or expenditures conducive to 
deficits, the argument came from the Ricardo Equivalence theory, 
introduced by Robert Barro in 1974. 4  It claimed that stimulus financed by 
bonds would produce no change in consumption. Consumers were 
assumed to be forward-looking, with a long horizon encompassing the life 
of their descendants. Therefore, their decisions, on the basis of the present 
discounted value of their resources, would count with tax increases in the 
future necessary to repay the issued debt. Consequently, their present 
consumption would not budge, and they would increase their savings 
subsequently to the stimulus offsetting its effects. Financing public 
expenditure by issuing bonds would give the same results as financing 
them with taxes, deficits did not matter after all. Ricardo, having raised the 
possibility, wrote that he did not believe it 5 There is a lot of empirical 
evidence against that extreme Ricardian hypothesis as it is predicated on 
a host of unrealistic assumptions: no liquidity constraints, no myopic 
horizons, no precautionary saving behaviour etc... There is also the 
awareness that a significant part of the debt is not paid up but is rolled over 
during long periods of time, especially when the debt to GDP ratio is going 
down.  
 It should be underlined that, differently from the previous argument, the 
Ricardian Equivalence argument does not apply in the case of pure 
temporary stimulus measures, because then tax revenues do not have to 
be increased forever to deal with it.  And the evidence is overwhelming that 
consumption and output respond to temporary measures in different 
degrees, according to other economic conditions. Fiscal multipliers are 
positive.  
Notwithstanding the good counterarguments I mentioned, the monetarist 
criticism of fiscal policy prevailed, and discretionary fiscal policy was 
progressively abandoned. Authorities still responded to the first 1973 oil 
shock with fiscal stimulus, but inflation accelerated further, which led to a 
strong monetary policy reaction.  Consequently, the FED implemented big 
rate increases in 1979-1980 after the second oil shock, creating a 
                                                          
4 Barro, Robert (1974) “ Are government bonds net wealth” Journal of Political Economy,  vol 82(6) p. 1095-1117 
5 See O´Driscoll, Gerad (1977) “ The Ricardian non equivalence theorem” Journal of Political Economy  vol 85(1) p 
207 
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recession. So, the 1973 first oil shock helped the monetarist reaction, 
despite the truth that the oil price increase that aggravated inflation was not 
a demand/monetary shock but corresponded to a supply shock triggering 
stagflation  
Since the 1977 seminal paper by Kydland and Prescott 6, there was also a 
drive to introduce in macro policies, rules instead of discretion. This idea 
provided arguments in favour central banks' independence to foster their 
credibility so that they could commit to long term rules.  
Another debate in the literature referred to whether there should be 
cooperation or separation between fiscal and monetary policies and 
respective responsible authorities. The analysis was very much dependent 
on assumptions about the market imperfections considered and on the 
model used. In the end, monetary policy gained dominance, more than 
simple separation, and a new consensus was formed, summed up in the 
following way by Kirsanova, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2009) 7 : “The 
consensus assignment … refers to the idea that monetary policy .. should 
normally focus on business cycle stabilisation and inflation control, while 
fiscal policy (at the macro level) should focus on the control of government 
debt or deficits.”  
The reduction of the fiscal policy stabilisation role attained its culmination 
with the early DSGE models that assumed total efficiency of monetary 
policy to place the economy at its economic potential and targeted inflation, 
just by changing interest rates. This omniscient power resulted in the 
models from the central role of Euler equations, an inter-temporal optimality 
condition that links today’s level of consumption to expected consumption 
in the next period and further into the future, responding to any change in 
the interest rate. The shortcomings of Euler equations have been well 
documented as, among other things, the interest rate targeted by monetary 
policy has no relation with the interest rate implicit in the Euler consumption 
function. 8 Euler equations have many other flaws as they neither envisage 
that consumers face idiosyncratic (household-specific) and uninsurable 
income uncertainty, nor that uncertainty interacts with credit or liquidity 
                                                          
6 Kydland, F.E. and E. Prescott (1997) “ Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans” Journal 
of Political Economy  Vol. 85, No. 3 (Jun., 1977), pp. 473-492 
7 Kirsanova, T-, Leith, C. and S. Wren-Lewis (2009) “ Monetary and fiscal policy interaction: the current consensus 
assignment in the light of recent developments”  The Economic Journal, 119, pp 482-496 
8 On the first point, see Carroll, Christopher D. (2001) ”Death to the Log-Linearized Consumption Euler Equation! 
(And Very Poor Health to the Second-Order Approximation)”, Advances in Macroeconomics: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 
6. http://www.bepress.com/bejm/advances/vol1/iss1/art6; on the second point, see Canzoneri, M. , Cumby, R. 
and B. Diba (2007) “ Euler equations and money market interest rates: A challenge for monetary policy models” 
Journal of Monetary Economics  vol 54, pp. 1863-1881 
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constraints. This is in stark contrast to recent research that emphasises the 
importance of precautionary saving, liquidity constraints, leverage, and 
heterogeneity, including heterogeneity in marginal propensities to 
consume.9 In practice, we know that monetary policy does not have the 
divine powers that these models pretend. 
On the immediate aftermath of the great financial crisis, the consensual 
assignment had to be broken, and fiscal policy was strongly activated, if 
only for just a couple of years. This was also the time when a long debate 
ensued about the size of fiscal multipliers and their variability according to 
the economic situation.  
A quite well-known survey of multipliers calculated by time-series methods 
by Valerie Ramey (2011) 10 finds expenditure multipliers varying from 0.8 
in normal times to 1.5 in economic slowdowns. Using structural models 
instead from the FED, the EU Commission, the ECB, the IMF, the OECD 
and B. of Canada, Coenen et al (2012) 11 find a range of values between 
0.9 and 1.3 which increases if the stimulus is maintained for two years and 
can reach 2.2 when accompanied by accommodative monetary policy. 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) 12 with a structural model, even 
find a multiplier of 3 when monetary policy is at the zero lower bound (ZLB).   
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) 13 in an IMF paper, explained the errors made 
in estimating the fiscal multipliers in the context of the first Greek 
adjustment programme and calculated a posteriori much higher values as 
it is appropriate in a crisis downturn. The mistake in the multipliers used in 
the programme led to a much severe GDP drop than what was intended.  
DeLong and Summers (2012) 14 by considering the assumptions of 
hysteresis effects and fiscal multipliers higher than 1 in a liquidity trap of 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Kaplan, G., and G. L. Violante (2014), “A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus 
Payments”, Econometrica, 82(4), 1199– 1239; John Muellbauer (2016) “Macroeconomics and Consumption” 
Oxford Department of Economics wp at https://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/department-of-economics-
discussion-paper-series/macroeconomics-and-consumption; and Mian, A., K. Rao, and A. Sufi (2013), 
“Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and the Economic Slump”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (4): 
1687-1726. 
10 Ramey, V. A. (2011) “Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?" Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 
49(3), pages 673-685, September 
11 Coenen, G. and Erceg, C. J. and Freedman, C. and Furceri, D., Kumhof, M., Lalonde, R.,Laxton, D., Linde, J., 
Mourougane, A., Muir, D., Mursula, S., de Resende, C., Roberts, J.,Roeger, W., Snudden, St., Trabandt, M., In't 
Veld, J. (2012 “Effects of Fiscal Stimulus in Structural Models". In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 
4(1), pp. 22-68, 
12 Christiano, L. and Eichenbaum, M. and Evans, C. L. (2011) “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a 
Shock to Monetary Policy". Journal of Political Economy, 113(1), pp. 1-45, 
13 Blanchard, O. J. and Leigh, D. (2013) “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers". IMF wp n.1 
14 DeLong, B. and L. Summers (2012) “ Fiscal policy in a depressed economy” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, Spring 2012 
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low interest rates, demonstrate how fiscal stimulus can lead to a reduction 
in the debt to GDP ratio rather than to the opposite desired effect.. Fatás 
and Summers (2015) 15 illustrate how excessive consolidation leaves 
behind permanent effects via hysteresis and can be self-defeating even 
aggravating the public debt ratio in some cases. Fatás (2018) 16 also 
illustrates how the GDP impact of fiscal consolidation that leads to a 
downward revision of potential output can induce more fiscal restraint in 
what he calls “a fiscal doom loop”.  
 Finally, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko in their 2017 Jackson Hole paper 17 
confirm their 2012 findings 18 and substantiate high multipliers (above 2) in 
recessions. Analysing 25 countries, they find cases of fiscal expansions in 
downturns that reduced the debt to GDP ratio, thus confirming the 
theoretical possibility. They also show that fiscal multipliers do not differ 
between low and high indebted countries.  
In conclusion, the literature on multipliers has established how fiscal policy 
is effective, especially in economic slowdowns like the one now ongoing. 
However, the recent rethinking of the use of fiscal policy has two other 
motivations. 
 First, the obvious diminishing returns to expansionary monetary policy 
after many years of experimenting with unconventional instruments without 
achieving its inflation targets. Second, the limits of monetary policy that is 
also constrained in a medium-term perspective in consequence of the 
secular stagnation that is affecting advanced economies and makes 
indispensable the use of fiscal policy.  
I start with the short term limitations of monetary policy, going through its 
different transmission channels. The interest rate channel shows reduced 
effects as interest rates along all maturities are already very low. The 
expectations channel cannot by itself significantly move the economy. 
Consequently, moving to monetary policy regimes of price level targeting or 
long-term averaging of inflation, cannot be effective. In both cases, 
economic agents cannot be convinced to change behaviour just based on 
the announcement of new goals. They want to see what are the instruments 
to achieve them. The forward guidance tool also depends on the weak 
expectations channel. Attempts to explore the exchange rate channel could 
                                                          
15  Fatás, A. and L H. Summers (2015) “The permanent effects of fiscal consolidations” CEPR DP n. 10902  
16 Fatás, A. (2018) “ Fiscal policy, potential output and the shifting goalposts” CEPR DP 13149 
17 Auerbach, A. J. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2017) „Fiscal Stimulus and Fiscal Sustainability". Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium, Jackson Hole,  
18 Auerbach, A. J. and Gorodnichenko, Y. (2012) “Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion". Fiscal 
Policy after the Financial Crisis, pages 63-98 National Bureau of Economic Research 
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only lead to currency wars that are destructive and self-defeating. 
Unconventional monetary policy was effective to mitigate the crisis and to 
start a recovery. Quantitative easing (QE) was valuable to lower yields when 
policy rates were near zero, it still works, but also with visible declining 
returns because of the present low levels of sovereign bond yields. Finally, 
negative policy rates should not be used further as they create a stressful 
situation for financial institutions that may lead to instability and even a 
reversal of their expansionary effects. This is an important point because 
several economists defend more negative rates as the solution for 
stabilisation. In past advanced economies` recessions, interest rates were 
reduced, usually 3 to 5 percentage points to prop up the economy. Some 
economists seem to believe that reducing rates from +6 to +2% is the same 
as lowering rates from zero to -4%. They argue in favour of penalising cash 
until it disappears and significant public subsidies to banks 19. Indeed, 
without those odd and controversial subsidies, there would be an eventually 
continuous reduction of banks' profitability, creating a reduced credit supply 
and financial instability.  
The deeper negatives rates would also have a host of other problematic 
effects. They would trigger asset price bubbles; allow zombie firms` survival 
that would lower productivity; returns pressure on pension schemes that 
could lead to people increasing savings to protect for old age, thus 
frustrating the expected increase in demand. To these aspects, we could 
also add the political economy consequences of the banks starting at a 
certain point to apply negative rates to retail deposits.  
 All these points illustrate why monetary policy was not, on the eve of the 
coronavirus crisis, in a good position to deal with a possible recessionary 
phase. In any case, both older theory and historical evidence substantiate 
that monetary policy is very efficient in controlling high inflation but always 
had limitations in confronting depressed economies and very low inflation.  
The fact that monetary policy became, however, quite expansionary is 
related to a different situation. What central banks had to do was to provide 
enough liquidity to keep the firms and the economy afloat and to implement 
securities purchases programmes to normalise their functioning that the 
crisis shock threatened to impair. The policy goals have been more about 
rescue and market normalisation than about economic stimulus. The 
recovery after the health emergency ends will be sluggish and uneven. To 
make it more robust, additional fiscal stimulus will be necessary because 
                                                          
19  Agarwal, R. and M.. Kimball (2019) “ Enabling Deep Negative Rates to Fight Recessions: A Guide” IMF wp 
19/84, April 
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monetary policy will not be in a position to do much more, for the reasons 
already mentioned.  
This reality of monetary policy limitations in particular cases, led Ben 
Bernanke in 2003 to advocate a type of “helicopter money” for Japan 20 with 
temporary monetary financing of growing public expenditures. In 2016 21 he 
suggested that the US Congress and the FED could have a joint procedure 
to authorise the concrete terms of temporary monetary financing. Last 
August, well-known former central bankers, like Stanley Fisher and Philipp 
Hildebrand, used this approach to propose the creation by Treasuries of 
emergency packages of measures, ready to be implemented, but with the 
central banks deciding the timing and the amounts to be mobilised.22  
These proposals reflect an acute awareness of the present monetary policy 
limits and the need for fundamental new thinking about macroeconomic 
policy. Naturally, these monetary financing proposals could not be applied 
in the EU without Treaty change, a very unlikely proposition. Another 
version of “helicopter money” refers to central bank direct distribution of 
money to every citizen, a difficult proposal to implement ensuring a level 
playing field, besides the doubts about the legal support for such an 
operation, that belongs clearly to the remit of Governments. In the US there 
are also discussions of monetary financing from the perspective of a highly  
expansionary fiscal policy promoted by the ideas of the flawed Modern 
Monetary Theory (MMT). 
The second dimension of the monetary policy limitations goes deeper than 
simply the response to short-term recessionary risks. Advanced economies 
are stuck in a protracted phase of secular stagnation with low growth, low 
inflation, and low interest rates. Its main feature is precisely the unbalance 
between the high propensity to save and the lower prospects for 
investment. Secular stagnation, in this case, refers to the demand-side 
version promoted by Larry Summers 23, that implies a situation of persistent 
lack of demand. The real equilibrium interest rate that ensures the planned 
savings-investment balance at full employment may indeed become 
                                                          
20 Ben Bernanke (2003) “Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan” speech in Tokyo, May.  
21 Bernanke, B, (2016) “What tools does the Fed have left? Part 3: Helicopter money”  Brookings blog at 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/04/11/what-tools-does-the-fed-have-left-part-
3-helicopter-money/ 
22 Bartsch, E., Boivin,J., Fisher, S. and P. Hilodebrand (2019) “ Dealing with the next downturn: From 
unconventional monetary policy to unprecedented policy coordination” Blackrock Investment Institute .  
23 See Summers L. (2016), “The age of secular stagnation: what it is and what to do about it” in Foreign Affairs 
March/April 2016 issue 
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negative as recent estimates for the advanced economies indicate 24. 
Rachel and Summers (2019) 25 show the continuous decline of the 
equilibrium rate in the OECD advanced countries since 1971 26.  
They conclude that: “neutral real interest rates have declined by at least 
300 basis points over the last generation.... We highlight the levels of 
government debt, the extent of pay-as-you-go old age pensions and the 
insurance value of government health care programs have all ceteris 
paribus operated to raise neutral real rates….we suggest that the “private 
sector neutral real rate” may have declined by as much as 700 basis points 
since the 1970s. Our findings support the idea that absent offsetting 
policies, mature industrial economies are prone to secular stagnation. This 
raises profound questions about stabilisation policy going forward.”  
It is therefore likely that for a protracted time, advanced countries will have 
to implement higher deficits, near zero interest rates (hopefully not 
negative), and try “finding structural policies that promote investment and 
reduce saving.”  
There are several structural causes for the unbalance between planned 
savings and investment, reflecting lack of aggregate demand, like 
demographic developments, technological shifts towards lower priced 
investments, income inequality, risk aversion, and consequent increase in 
risk premia … 
While all these factors create obstacles for the economy to reach potential, 
there are also supply-side structural factors, underlined by Robert Gordon 
in a series of papers27 that contribute to the low growth of potential output 
itself. The two broad frameworks about secular stagnation are therefore not 
mutually exclusive. One emphasises supply-side factors that lower 
potential growth while the other points at the chronic weakness in demand 
as the root cause of secular stagnation. The fact that prices are not 
buoyantly increasing as it would be the case of supply insufficiency 
                                                          
24 The concept of a “natural” real interest rate is a controversial one and both Keynes and Friedman did not 
accept it (see Constâncio, Vítor (2016) “The challenges of low interest rates and monetary policy” pages 3-4 at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160615.en.html 
25 Rachel, L- and L. Summers (2019)“On Falling Neutral Real Rates, Fiscal Policy,and the Risk of Secular 
Stagnation” Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, March  
26 For other estimates see  Brand, C. and F. Mazeli (2019) “Taylor-rule consistent estimates of the natural rate of 
interest” ECB wp n. 2257; Holston, K., T. Laubach, and J. C. Williams (2017): “Measuring the natural rate of 
interest: International trends and determinants,” Journal of International Economics, 108, 59–75; Hamilton, J. D., 
E. S. Harris, J. Hatzius, and K. D. West (2016): “The Equilibrium Real Funds Rate: Past, Present, and Future,” IMF 
Economic Review, 64, 660 – 707.   
27 See  Gordon, Robert J. (2012). “Is U. S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six 
Headwinds,” NBER Working Paper 18315;  Gordon, Robert J. (2014). “The demise of U.S. economic growth: 
restatement, rebuttal, and reflections” NBER wp 19895;  Gordon, R.J. (2016), “The Rise and Fall of American 
Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil War”, Princeton University Press. 
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suggests that lack of demand is the prevailing factor. However, demand 
and supply factors may reinforce each other because a chronic weakness 
in demand would amplify and exacerbate supply constraints as, for 
instance, the fact that persistent unemployment may hamper workers’ set 
of skills, thereby curtailing the productive capacity of the economy. 28  
The important point to underline here is that secular stagnation undermines 
the role of monetary policy as an answer to low growth and low inflation. 
This implies that fiscal policy must, in the future play a more active role. If 
the private sector wants to save more than spend in real investment, either 
a current account surplus develops and/or interest rates get lower, and 
asset prices tend to rise. The alternative then is for the government to go 
into deficit, dissaving to offset private “excess” saving.  This would increase 
deficits and the supply of government bonds, which would also lead to 
higher interest rates, including the real equilibrium rate in a normal non-
Ricardian world. A smaller current account surplus would also be achieved. 
The euro area has kept over the past few years a surplus well above the 
Chinese one. A fiscal stimulus would thus solve several problems at once, 
including the necessary increase in safe assets that, in view of the regretful 
absence of a European safe asset, would start to repair the acute scarcity 
of such securities that is affecting financial stability. The reduction of a very 
large current account surplus would also avoid possible hostile retaliatory 
reactions from other countries, especially from the United States.  
The prevailing low interest rates that secular stagnation says will continue 
for the foreseeable future offer support for additional fiscal space. Olivier 
Blanchard (2019) in his AEA lecture 29, highlighted how the very low rates 
contribute to mitigate or even eliminate the budget deficit consequences, 
both on the debt ratio to GDP and the welfare costs of higher public debt. 
This is the result of the average risk-free rate paid by sovereigns being 
below the rate of GDP growth. This has happened in significant periods 
during the recent decades in the US and other advanced countries. Since 
the sixties that inequality prevailed, on average, 50% of the time in OECD 
countries. 
Blanchard is cautious not to draw imprudent recommendations for future 
fiscal policy despite secular stagnation pointing to a long period of low rates 
                                                          
28 See Blanchard, O. and L. Summers (1986), “Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem”, NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 1. 
29 Blanchard, O. (2019) “Public Debt and Low Interest Rates” American Economy Review,  May 2019 
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30. Financial markets seem to agree, judging by the embedded expectations 
of low rates up to 30 years! 
On the other hand, there is the possibility that an exaggeration of the 
primary deficit and the debt could lead to a sudden upward revision of 
yields, changing their relationship with the growth rate. This means that 
very high debt ratios, some above 100%, did not cease to be a potential 
problem all of a sudden. However, the prospect of a prolonged period of 
low rates does provide some easing of concerns with the debt, at the 
moment when fiscal policy is called to perform a more substantial role in 
our economies.    
This perspective does not imply that fiscal rules should be abandoned as, 
in general, they are necessary to counter the “deficit bias” tendency that 
has many causes, from electoral competition to informational problems or 
to time inconsistency behaviour. 31  In a monetary union, there are 
additional reasons for the existence of such rules in order to avoid 
countries` free riding and to control undesirable externalities. These include 
both the negative spillovers from possible high debt having to be 
restructured in a member country and to demand externalities from fiscal 
policy that have become even more relevant when interest rates are at the 
effective lower bound.   
A good fiscal rule should take these externalities into account and cater for 
two main goals:  1) restrain “deficit bias” to avoid excessive debt 
accumulation; 2) allow public finance to play a macroeconomic stabilisation 
role as a shock absorber, especially when monetary policy is constrained 
or when countries are members of monetary union and lost their own 
monetary policy. There are also other arguments, unrelated to 
macroeconomic stabilisation or monetary unions, that justify the use of 
deficits and debt as shock absorbers. I am referring to the mainstream 
optimising analysis of tax smoothing, which recommends the mitigation of 
tax volatility to minimise their burden over time. 32 This tax smoothing 
argument implies, for instance, that after negative shocks, the debt ratio to 
GDP should adjust down very gradually. However, I will not dwell further on 
this subject.  
                                                          
30 On the caution perspective about fiscal space, see Mehrotra, N. (2017) “ Debt sustainability in a low interest 
rate world” Brookings Hutchins Center wp n. 32 
31 See Calmfors, L. and S. Wren-Lewis (2011) “ What should Fiscal Councils do? “ Economic Policy  Vol. 26 5 
32 Barro, R. J. (1979) “ On the determination of public debt”  Journal of Political Economy,  vol. 87, p 940-971; 
Portes, J. and S. Wren-Lewis (2015) “ Issues in the design of fiscal policy rules” in  The Manchester School  Vol 83 
No S3; Begnigno, P and M. Woodford (2004) “ Optimal monetary and fiscal policy: a linear-quadratic approach” 
NBER wp n. 9905 
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 What is relevant, regarding the present European fiscal rules, is that they 
do not appropriately acknowledge the two aspects involved in fiscal policy 
exerting a shock-absorbing role. First, there is not sufficient recognition 
embedded in the rules themselves, of situations where monetary policy is 
particularly constrained and limited, as it is presently the case. Second, the 
fiscal rule – the Stability Pact- is unbalanced in not allowing sufficient room 
for the stabilisation role of fiscal policy in member countries, making it 
procyclical at the euro area level.  
That procyclical bias can be illustrated in a simple way, e.g. by comparing 
from 2000 to 2018, the evolution of the output gap with the cyclical adjusted 
primary budget balance (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 
   
 
Contrasting with fiscal policy in the US, in the euro area, the primary 
structural balance, became positive since 2011 while the output gap stayed 
quite negative. The double dip in growth in the EA was mostly due to the 
coordinated fiscal consolidation in EA country members implemented from 
2011 to 2013. Simulations with the EU Commission model Quest show that 
fiscal policy contributed to cumulative GDP deviations from the baseline 
scenario that vary by country from 8 to 18%.33 Given the new perspectives 
                                                          
33 Jan in 't Veld (2013) Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the Euro area periphery and core” EU Commission 
Economic Papers n. 506; see also Rannenberg, A., Schoder, C., and Strasky, J. (2015). The macroeconomic effects 
of the euro area’s fiscal consolidation 2011-2013: A simulation-based approach. Research Technical Paper 
03/RT/2015, Central Bank of Ireland. 
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concerning fiscal policy,  we need in Europe to undergo a conceptual 
change and promote the revision of our procyclical fiscal framework. For a 
lasting resilience of the euro area we must have a better way of dealing 
with cyclical adjustment in our economies. The time has arrived to start 
discussing the revision of the Stability Pact to achieve a better balance 
between its two objectives of controlling the debt externality among 
member countries and allowing a proper stabilisation role for fiscal policy. 
Both goals are important in a monetary union.   
A fiscal rule can be designed around norms for the debt, the deficit or the 
expenditure path. The present European rule uses all three, in a maze of 
rigid quantitative targets and exceptions that require a Vade Mecum with 
more than 200 pages to explain it 34. It is too complex, difficult to manage 
and enforce as it is open to contradictory commands. Also, the rules 
became more intrusive, creating the potential for political tensions, as we 
saw several times. The independent European Fiscal Board assessed that 
the Pact has “overlapping fiscal requirements that occasionally offer 
conflicting signals: a structural adjustment and a target for debt reduction.” 
and “policies are monitored using a multitude of indicators, which inevitably 
cause conflicting signals” 35. Sometimes, these conflicts make impossible 
the full use of the automatic stabilisers as countries are subject to 
quantitative targets for the debt, for two concepts of deficit (one nominal, 
another structural), for expenditure growth and for annual targets regarding 
progress towards debt and the medium-term structural deficit objective.   
During the crisis, in 2009, Germany changed its 40 years old constitutional 
law that had introduced the “golden rule” allowing deficits equal to 
investment expenditure, with a new law establishing that the maximum 
structural deficit is 0.35% and that any past deviations accumulate in a 
“memory account” to be winded down in the future.36 .  Following this 
surprising restrictive path in the midst of a recession the Stability Pact 
regulations were significantly tightened in 2011 and in 2012 when 25 EU 
countries signed an Intergovernmental Treaty 37, the so-called Fiscal 
Compact, introducing stricter rules regarding deficits and debt. A maximum 
medium-term objective for the structural deficit was set at 0.5% (0.35% in 
                                                          
34 EU Commission (2019) “ Vade Mecum on the Stability & Growth Pact” at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-finance/ip101_en.pdf 
35 European Fiscal Board (2019) “ Reforming the EU fiscal framework: A proposal by the European Fiscal Board” 
Chapter 17 of the CEPR ebook “Risk Sharing Plus Market Discipline: A New Paradigm for Euro Area Reform? A 
Debate”  
36 The “debt brake” law was adopted in 2009, revoking the “golden rule” in place since 1969. See A. Thiele ( 
2015) “ The German way of curbing public debt : The Constitutional Debt Brake and the Fiscal Compact” in 
European Constitutional Law Review, 11: 30–54, 2015 
37 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) 
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the case of the German law).  If we assume that over the very long term 
positive and negative output gap effects cancel out, that limit implies a long-
term debt ratio well below 20%, considering nominal average growth 
between 3 and 4%. This would create acute shortages of safe assets for 
the financial system that became since the crisis fully collateralised. 38  
Another change was the imposition that any deviation above the 60% target 
has to be reduced 5% per year, on average, over three years.  Besides 
being the average level of the time,  the other explanation for the 60% target 
fixed in the Treaty, was the fact that in the long-term the ratio between a 
3% deficit and 5% nominal growth would converge to a debt to GDP ratio 
of 60%. The present conditions of secular stagnation, low inflation, and low 
interest rates destroy the economic rationale for such numbers.  
The definition of a long-term target for the debt ratio to GDP is fraught with 
difficulties. There is no theoretical basis for any particular level. Regarding 
a rule for the deficit, the proper concept is the cyclically adjusted balance, 
which is very difficult to calculate with precision, is subject to significant 
revisions as the measure of the output gap is also frequently revised. It is, 
therefore, subject to bitter discussions with member countries on approval 
and compliance. Another quality of a good quantitative fiscal rule is that it 
should change with some contingencies, namely when monetary policy is 
constrained by the effective lower bound of interest rates. 39 This feature is 
missing in the European Rule 
All these problems led some economists to despair of finding well designed 
quantitative fiscal rules capable of accommodating different objectives and 
contingencies. Eichengreen and Wyplocz (2016) 40 go as far as proposing 
renationalisation of fiscal policy, as they maintain that fiscal spillovers 
among countries are small, a view that others dispute.41  That change would 
give more responsibility to member states in facing markets because it 
would be accompanied by a credible no-bailout rule and the increased 
possibility of debt restructuring. We saw, however, how this worked in 2010-
2015.  
                                                          
38 Gorton, G.and He (2016) “ Optimal monetary policy in a collateralized economy” NBER wp 22599; see also 
Gorton, G and G. Ordoñez (2014) “ Collateral crises”  American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 102: 
101-106. 
39 See a theoretical background for that possible discussion in Portes, J. and S_W Lewis (2015) “ Issues in the 
design of fiscal policy rules” in  The Manchester School  Vol 83 No S3 pp 56-86. 
40 Eichengreen, B and C. Wyplocz (2016) “Minimal conditions for the survival of the euro” in VoxEU ebook “ How 
to fix Europe’s monetary union: Views of leading economists”, CEPR Press, 2016 
41 This is confirmed in the recent ECB wp by Attinasi, M-G, Lalik, M. and I. Vetlov (2017) Fiscal spillovers in the 
euro area, a model based analysis” ECB wp n. 2040, March 2017; For a different view see Blanchard, O., Erceg, 
C.J. and J. Lindé (2017) “Jump-starting the euro area recovery:would a rise fiscal spending helpthe periphery? 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
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In the same vein, Blanchard, Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2019) 42 recently 
presented a preliminary version of a proposal that would abolish all the 
existent quantitative goals, substituting them by guiding principles or 
standards that would be enforced by the EU Commission in a more 
discretionary way. The Commission would also have the possibility of 
taking countries before the European Court of Justice in case of non-
compliance. The whole proposal would require a Treaty change, which 
makes it very difficult to be implemented.  
Nevertheless, these are intriguing proposals that deserve some reflection 
and debate in view of all problems with the implementation of the Pact over 
the years. 43 However, I would prefer a two-pronged approach to revise the 
European fiscal rule, thinking mostly from the perspective of the euro area 
requirements. On the one hand, the Stability Pact should be revised along 
the lines of an expenditure growth rule without a formulaic annual 
progression towards the long-term target of 60%, keeping the 3% Treaty 
limit for the nominal deficit but abandoning targets for the structural 
balance. One advantage of this new rule is that it could be approved without 
a Treaty change. On the other hand, a European Stabilisation Fund would 
be created to deal with significant asymmetric or symmetric recessionary 
shocks that cannot be easily accommodated by an expenditure fiscal rule.  
Four additional features should be included in the expenditure rule: 
- The expenditures considered would be net of interest payments, 
unemployment subsidies and increases in revenues due to discretionary 
changes in taxation. 
- The annual target for expenditure growth would depend on a medium-
term projection of nominal potential growth and the judgemental 
conclusion about the convergence for the long term debt ratio target. 
- The judgement involved in that component would take in consideration 
a broader debt sustainability analysis and the short-term situation of the 
economy. 
- National Fiscal Councils would prepare the projections for potential 
growth over the medium term. 
This last point is an important difference from the proposal made in a Note 
of the French Conseil D`Analyse Économique 44 that would give the power 
                                                          
42 Blanchard, O., Leandro, A. and J. Zettelmeyer (2019) Revisiting the EU fiscal rules in an era of low interest 
rates”  slide presentation at the Law and Macro Conference, Georgetown Law  
43 On a thorough assessment of the way the Pact has worked see the European Fiscal Board Report ( 2019)  
“Assessment of EU fiscal rules with a focus on the six and two-pack legislation” August 
44  Zsolt Darvas , Philippe Martin et Xavier Ragot (2018) “European Fiscal Rules Require a Major Overhaul” 
Conseil D´Analyse Économique, Note n. 47 at http://www.cae-eco.fr/IMG/pdf/cae-note047v3.pdf . See also 
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to the national Fiscals Councils to decide on the annual target for the 
expenditure ceiling. Such delegitimisation of national Governments and 
Parliaments in fiscal matters goes too far... It is preferable to continue to 
subject the national budgets to the European Semester procedures already 
in place.  Another version of an expenditure rule was also proposed by the 
European Fiscal Board, introducing, however, an even stricter annual 
reduction of the debt ratio that makes it unacceptable 45.  
Regarding enforcement, market discipline has been reinforced by two 
significant changes adopted by the last December Summit. First, the 
introduction of “single limb” clauses in sovereign debt issuance that 
generalises to all debt instruments what would be decided about one of its 
components in the context of a debt restructuring. The second was a 
change in the regime regarding the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) 
mandatory before any ESM programme decision. This DSA changed from 
being the sole responsibility of the independent EU Commission to become 
a cooperative exercise with the ESM, a purely intergovernmental body.  
 An expenditure rule is much less procyclical than the present regime. Still, 
it cannot deal efficiently with significant temporary recessionary shocks and 
does not offer a solution if some member states do not want to use the 
fiscal space they have. For this purpose, it is necessary to create a 
European  Stabilisation Fund. The IMF made a good proposal to design it 
46. For periods of quite significant shocks, it takes the form of a “rainy-day” 
fund with borrowing capacity that would provide transfers to be used in 
public spending with high multipliers. Transfers should not permanently 
benefit the same countries, so a cap would be introduced, and, to avoid 
moral hazard, the use of the Fund should be conditional on past compliance 
by countries with the existent fiscal rules. Triggering the transfers should be 
automatically dependent on a threshold indicator based on significant 
changes in the unemployment rate. 
The two reforms proposed are crucial to make the space of the European 
monetary union a truly integrated economic area disposing of an 
appropriate macroeconomic stabilisation framework. Without this 
stabilisation function, monetary union can always be subject to disruptive 
                                                          
Chapter 16 of the CEPR ebook. “Risk Sharing Plus Market Discipline: A New Paradigm for Euro Area Reform? A 
Debate” 
45 European Fiscal Board (2019) “ Reforming the EU fiscal framework: A proposal by the European Fiscal Board” 
Chapter 17 of the CEPR ebook “Risk Sharing Plus Market Discipline: A New Paradigm for Euro Area Reform? A 
Debate” 
46
 Arnold, N., Bergljot Barkbu, Elif Ture (2018) “Hou Wang, and Jiaxiong Yao (2018) “ A Central Fiscal 
Stabilization Capacity for the Euro Area” IMF SDN/18/03 
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shocks and potential dangerous fragmentation. These possibilities have 
become evident with the present crisis and forced the suspension of the 
Stability Pact for an undefined period. Its current inadequacy adds to the 
arguments to proceed with its revision. 
The return of fiscal policy to the frontline of economic thinking offers a 
favourable conceptual background to get right a revised European fiscal 
framework.  
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